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INTRODUCTION
In secular societies, the principle of rule of law implies that
churches and other social institutions may not assert themselves as
above the law or replace the official law1 with their moral or canon
rules. Abiding by this principle is a problem not only for the
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC or the Church), but also for many
other religious denominations that historically have carried
considerable sway over social and political life in their countries by
way of their “moral entrepreneurship”2 and that are now reluctant
to cede that influence. Surely, different denominations tackle the
principle of rule of law in different ways, and the extent of their
resistance and collaboration with this principle varies broadly—
from theocratic regimes with high levels of resistance to the official
 Mikhail Antonov is a Professor of Law associated with the Law Faculty at the
National Research University, Higher School of Economics (Saint Petersburg).
1. Distinguished from canon law, customary law, soft law, and other varieties of
“living law” would be embraced by a broad understanding of law as a form of normative or
social ordering. See, e.g., Mikhail Antonov, In the Quest of Global Legal Pluralism, in
POSITIVITÄT, NORMATIVITÄT UND INSTITUTIONALITÄT DES RECHTS 15–30 (Aulis Aarnio et al.
eds., 2013).
2. This kind of moral authority analyzed by Professor Stoeckl means that the Church
takes part in constructing cognitive frames of Russian society in order to guide public
perceptions of appropriateness, sometimes contrary to the letter of law. Kristina Stoeckl, The
Russian Orthodox Church as Moral Norm Entrepreneur, 44 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 132 (2016).
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law to liberal regimes in which churches tend to collaborate rather
than resist. Not surprisingly, each case often corresponds with the
legal culture and history within each respective country.
This is the case in Russia, where the principle of rule of law and
the provision regarding the separation of church and state in the
1993 Constitution are placed into a larger intellectual framework in
which the Church has reinforced the legitimacy of the State and its
legal prescriptions. Certain developments in post-Soviet Russia
suggest that the Church’s ambitions go far beyond the status quo
that existed before the 1917 Revolution. The restoration of the
Patriarchate in 1918, along with important privileges that the ROC
snatched from the weak Russian State in the early 1990s, stir the
Church’s ambitions toward more aspirational goals. These
ambitions are informed by narratives glorifying traditions of
cooperation of church and state in Russian medieval history and
the ideology that underpinned this cooperation. In turn, this
ideology goes back to Byzantine social philosophies where churchstate cooperation was described in terms of Symphonia.
Theoretically, almost no type of church-state relations, beyond
radical atheistic and theocratic regimes, a priori violate the rule of
law. In this sense, French laicité, American wall of separation, as well
as cooperationist models are generally compatible with the rule of
law. However, church-state cooperation in contemporary Russia
often provokes concerns and criticism as being incompatible with
the principles of rule of law and of secularity which are enshrined
in Articles 1 and 14 of the Russian Constitution.3 While the model
of church-state relations in the Russian Constitution is literally
separationist (it has both free exercise and establishment clauses),
constitutional practices, ordinary laws, and administrative
practices are grounded on an absolutely different logic of favoring
the ROC and disfavoring non-traditional religious denominations.4
The present Article will outline the legal, ideological, and ethical
background of this contradiction, focusing on the prevailing

3. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] (Russ.) The
official English version is available at Russia’s Supreme Court website,
http://www.supcourt.ru/en/documents/constitution/, with amendments through July
21, 2014. Unless indicated otherwise, references to “Article” or “Chapter” in this Article shall
mean articles and chapters of the Russian Constitution.
4. See generally Mikhail Antonov & Ekaterina Samokhina, The Realist and Rhetorical
Dimensions of the Protection of Religious Feelings in Russia, 40 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 229 (2015).
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ideological pattern of church-state cooperation described with
reference to the Byzantine concept of Symphonia.
As will be shown below, this concept is still utilized by the ROC
to embrace an ideal model of church-state relations that largely
differs from the original Byzantine version and from its
conceptualizations in medieval Russia. Is this model in its Russian
version—in the manner reflected in the ROC’s main policy
documents—compatible with the principle of rule of law
(Rechtsstaat)5 enshrined in Article 1 of the Russian Constitution?
This problem will be analyzed by examining the example of the
Church’s attitude toward human rights and, more specifically, how
the Church manipulates religious teaching on human dignity to
reinterpret the liberal conception of human rights enshrined in the
Russian Constitution. My working hypothesis is that the Church’s
attitude is intertwined with the ROC’s larger strategy to assume the
lead in ideological spheres; this strategy itself problematizes the
principle of secularity and separation of state and church. So far,
the State has not actively resisted this strategy of the Church,
putatively seeing the Church only as an efficient tool for fostering
the government’s legitimacy and without considering the Church
as a serious competitor in political and ideological matters.6
The Church’s attitude toward the separation principle is
ambiguous. On the one hand, the ROC endorses it to protect its own
competences and interests from the State’s interferences, appealing
to human rights and the separation principle when the State’s
intrusions are perceived as exorbitant. On the other hand, the
Church claims that state and church shall be one, like body and soul
(the body language that underpins the concept of Symphonia), so
that the Church may, in the legal field, prioritize religious morals
over legal norms and principles and define limits for the
interpretation and application of human rights. This normative
conflict becomes clear when the Church imposes its moral
conception of human dignity on the liberal reading of human
5. The Russian term pravovoe gosudarstvo utilized in the Constitution is the literal
translation of Rechtsstaat, but in legal scholarship this Russian term covers both Rechtsstaat
and rule of law.
6. Such an attitude seems to reflect the real political situation in which the ROC has
little chance to really assert its will and to impose it on the State. Nonetheless, this does not
impede aspirational thinkers from creating ambitious, albeit unrealistic schemes of
restoration of Symphonia. These schemes are enshrined in a number of normative documents
of the Church and are repeatedly utilized by its top hierarchs, which confirms their symbolic
power and ideological attractivity.
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rights.7 In another dimension, this conflict means that the ROC
thereby challenges not only the principle of secularity, but also calls
into question the principle of rule of law.
One may be surprised: Why discuss this latter principle in
Russia—a country that is heavily criticized for the lack of the rule
of law in many spheres? The present Article does not intend to
analyze whether this criticism is justified or not. Regardless, the
rule of law is often not black and white, so that one might miss the
point of arguing that some countries have this principle
incorporated into their law and politics and some have not. For socalled transitory countries (on the way from socialist popular
democracies toward western liberal democracies), this principle
can be seen rather as a polychromic continuum—Russia, Poland,
Hungary, and other post-socialist countries have established the
rule of law de jure as a constitutional principle, but de facto have yet
to succeed in fully implementing it.8
This Article does not have the ambition to evaluate Russia’s
success or failure in moving along this transformational path. My
use of the term “rule of law” here means only that de jure, Russia
has the rule of law in a sense as the rule of written laws or rule by
law, which means that secular laws govern every other social norm,
including religious ones.9 This is confirmed by the abovementioned constitutional provisions and by the fact that state law
evidently prevails over other normative orders of “living law” in
Russia. De facto, although Russia does not soar in rule-of-law
rankings, at least, it is not the last country on the list, which
suggests that there is at least “some” rule of law in Russia.
Part I addresses the long-term strategy of the Church to
cooperate with the State so that this latter protects the Church,
while the Church legitimizes the State’s policies insofar as these fit
the Church’s objectives.
This strategy could efficiently work in Imperial Russia where
the Orthodoxy was an official religion and, since the eighteenth
7. See generally KRISTINA STOECKL, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2014).
8. Among others, the conception of the rule of law as a continuum, not a black and
white dichotomy, is developed by Professor Gowder. See PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW
IN THE REAL WORLD (2016).
9. Discretional disrespect of law and its misuses in “high-profile cases” is another
conceptual aspect that goes beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley,
Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia, in DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN POLITICS 9, 108–18 (Richard
Sakwa et al. eds., 2019).
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century, the emperor was also the head of the Church. When the
Church attempted to regain its power in post-Soviet Russia, it
followed this pre-revolutionary pattern of church-state
cooperation. But, as Part II argues, this strategy was no longer
compatible with the principles enshrined in the 1993 Constitution.
The Church had to tackle this discrepancy and, as a result, the
Church’s Social Concept appeared in 2000. Part III examines the
attempted combination of theological and constitutional principles
in that document. The conception of Symphonia proposed by the
Concept did not fit either the Russian Constitution or the Orthodox
teaching on church-state cooperation.
Despite this principal incompatibility, the conception of
Symphonia became widely applied not only by the Church’s
hierarchs but also by Russian political leaders. In fact, Symphonia as
interpreted in the Social Concept turned into one of ideological
tools of the Russian State. This transformation is briefly studied in
Part IV, where the 2020 constitutional amendments are cited as one
of the typical patterns of this cooperation.
This tandem work of the State and the Church was not
cloudless—gradually certain tensions became perceptible. At some
points the Church, inspired by too-ambitious interpretations of
Symphonia, tried to impose onto the State solutions which were
overtly incompatible with the constitutional law. These tensions are
examined in Part V.
It turns out that on such sensitive issues as that of human rights,
the State is not ready to fully replace its legal rules by the Church’s
religious ethics, although interpretation of these rules rarely goes
in line with conservative doctrines of the Church. This situation is
summed up in the Conclusion.
I.

THE CHURCH’S ASPIRATIONS TO WORK IN
TANDEM WITH THE STATE

According to the Preamble of the 1997 Russian Law On Freedom
of Conscience and Religious Associations, Russian Orthodoxy holds a
“special role in the history of Russia and in the establishment and
development of Russia’s spirituality and culture.”10 Along with this
10. Federal’nyĭ Zakon RF o Svobode Sovesti i o Religioznykh Ob”edinenii͡akh [Federal
Law of the Russian Federation on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations]
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII, [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
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symbolic recognition, the Church received a number of material
privileges, from duty-free tobacco imports to the return of
properties nationalized by the Bolsheviks. In return, the ROC
works to maintain the legitimacy of state power and, for this
purpose, appropriates that power to define the ultimate goals of
social development in Russia. This de facto situation resulted from
the ideological vacuum of the early 1990s and the general weakness
of the State at that time. This situation enabled the Church’s
aspirations. Under Putin’s rule, the Russian State actively started to
reestablish its symbolic power and to demonstrate its own
ideological ambition. This immediately prompted the ROC to craft
several documents in which it attempted to restate its ideological
authority, relying on centuries-old Russian and Orthodox tradition.
Illustratively, in recent years the Church has supported the
State not only by legitimizing its power inside Russia, but also by
endorsing controversial Russian campaigns abroad, like the Syrian
war or the conflict with Ukraine.11 The ROC was also able to creep
into decision-making processes at different levels of political power
and to make its voice be heard with respect to some principal legal
matters, including anti-gay and domestic violence legislation.12 The
2020 constitutional amendments,13 in which the Church
successfully lobbied for the heterosexual marriage clause,14 the
state-forming people clause,15 and the mentions of traditional
values and God in the Constitution, can be considered as one of its
Collection of Legislation] 1997, No. 125. The official Russian version is available at
http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102049359.
11. See, e.g., Dmitry Adamsky, The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow’s
Syrian Campaign, PONARS EURASIA (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.ponarseurasia.org/
memo/role-russian-orthodox-church-moscows-syrian-campaign;
Mikhail
Suslov,
The Russian Orthodox Church and the Crisis in Ukraine, in CHURCHES IN THE UKRAINIAN
CRISIS 133–62 (Andrii Krawchuk & Thomas Bremer eds., 2016).
12. See, e.g., Jamie Manson, The Orthodox Church’s Role in Russia’s Anti-Gay Laws, NAT’L
CATH. REP. (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/grace-margins/orthodoxchurch-s-role-russia-s-anti-gay-laws; Russian Orthodox Leader Rails Against ‘Foreign’ Domestic
Violence Law, MOSCOW TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/01/
07/russian-orthodox-leader-rails-against-foreign-domestic-violence-law-a68829.
13. Federal’nyĭ Zakon RF o Popravke k Konstitut͡sii Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡siĭ [Federal Law
of the Russian Federation on Amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation]
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII, [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2020, No. 1. The official Russian version is available at
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202003140001.
14. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] (Russ.) art. 72,
para. 1, pt. zh.-1 (adopted 2020).
15. Id. art. 68, para. 1.
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latest significant ideological victories.16 However, apart from
bargaining for ad hoc privileges, there was no realistic long-term
strategy in the ROC’s relations with the Russian State—the
Church’s ideological and other ambitions had aspirational
character informed by rather old conceptual schemes with little to
do with actual Russian constitutional law. It comes therefore as no
wonder that the Church sometimes was unsuccessful in its
attempts to impose a number of legislative restrictions, such as the
ban on abortion.17
The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (the
Social Concept), adopted at the Sacred Bishops’ Council of the ROC
on August 14, 2000,18 was the first consistent attempt to outline a
strategy of the Church in its interaction with the State. This strategy
exposed the medieval conception of Symphonia, which hardly fits
the Russian Constitution. The Social Concept’s authors utilized
Symphonia to outline the ROC’s ideal pattern in terms of the
relationship between “body” (state) and “soul” (church): “[I]t is in
their linkage and harmony that the well-being of a state lies.”19
References to the past usually reinforce modern-day ideological
messages (not infrequently without accounting for differences
between past and present situations) by comparing them with
seemingly persuasive examples that stir national pride and the
ideology of the greatness of state power (velikoderzhavnost’, in
Russian conservative parlance). From this standpoint, it is not
surprising that the Church decided to justify its cooperation with
the State and the equal status within this cooperation by allusions
16. Kristina Stoeckl justly opined that “[t]he Church officials were, in short, successful
in having their priorities reflected in the Russian constitution of 2020.” Kristina Stoeckl, The
End of Post-Soviet Religion: Russian Orthodoxy as a National Church, PUB. ORTHODOXY (July 20,
2020), https://publicorthodoxy.org/2020/07/20/the-end-of-post-soviet-religion/.
17. All that the ROC could gain in its long and still ongoing struggle against abortions
in Russia was a declaratory agreement on cooperation with the R.F. Ministry of Public Health
regarding healthcare. Article 9 of this agreement (signed on June 18, 2015) describes how the
Ministry and the Church will coordinate their efforts in matters pertaining to pregnancy and
childbirth. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, SOGLASHENIE O SOTRUDNICHESTVE MEZHDU
MINISTERSTVOM ZDRAVOOKHRANENIIA
͡ ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATS͡ II I RUSSKOĬ PRAVOSLAVNOĬ
T͡SERKOVʹIU
͡ (2015), http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4124569.html. This declaratory
document is characteristic for the general framework of Symphonia between the Church and
the state authorities. Id.
18. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, THE BASIS OF THE SOCIAL CONCEPT
(2000), http://orthodoxrights.org/documents/the-basis-of-the-social-concept [hereinafter
SOCIAL CONCEPT].
19. Id. § III.4. Below, paragraphs (para.) will refer to the Social Concept’s sections or, if
specially mentioned, to sections of the Basic Teaching on Dignity.
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to centuries-old patterns stemming from the “glorious past” of
Russia and of Byzantium (portrayed as the spiritual predecessor of
Orthodox Russia, the “second Rome”). This conceptual reference is
quite ambiguous and theoretically risks creating conflicts between
the ROC and the Russian State. The apparent problem is that within
the framework of “symphonic” cooperation, the Church uses its
power to influence the State’s legislative and judicial decisions,
which is unacceptable in a rule-of-law state.20
The kind of Symphonia formulated in the Social Concept suggests
that the Church appropriates its power to define what the social,
spiritual, and other goals of the society shall be, and leaves to the
State only to decide how to reach these goals, implicitly preserving
a kind of “veto power.” The Church shall retain the right to
evaluate state policies and norms,21 and given that “God’s
commandment to fulfil the task of salvation in any situation and
under any circumstances is above this loyalty,” the Church may
“refuse to obey the State.”22 Body politics in the Social Concept,
analogies with consubstantiality, and other mystical allegories did
not contribute to a sensible delineation of mutual requirements and
competences of the Russian State and the Church. Their relations
gradually turned into an implicit de facto alliance, with no clear
rules of the game either for the Church or the State. The difficulty
with playing Symphonia between the Russian State and the ROC is
that the Church’s claims do not fit with either the real political
situation or current Russian law. Informed by the Slavophile
ideology,23 neither party pays enough attention to the differences
between the legal frameworks of Byzantium and medieval Russia,
and current Russian constitutional law.
One oft-cited example from early Russian history can illustrate
this symphonic approach. When Prince Vladimir the Great in AD
20. In Russia, churches are not legally precluded from lobbying for political decisions,
so the ROC’s insistence on making its voice heard does not contradict as such the rule of
law principle. Also, in liberal democracies, religious beliefs of policymakers can play a
significant role. However, the expressions utilized by the authors of the Social Concept
and their tonality demonstrate that the Church’s ambitions go far beyond a simple
participation in public deliberations. As will be shown below, the ROC claims, along with
the power to give binding advice to state authorities, a kind of veto right for state policies
and judicial and legislative decisions.
21. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.4.
22. Id. § III.5 (emphasis omitted).
23. Mikhail Suslov, Genealogiia monarkhicheskoi idei v postsovetskikh politicheskikh
diskursakh Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi, 3 GOSUDARSTVO, RELIGIIIA, TSERKOV’ V ROSSII I ZA
RUBEZHOM 75–116 (2014).
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996 decided, shortly after the Baptism of 988, to abolish capital
punishment, clerics persuaded the Prince that he had been divinely
appointed to reward the just and to punish the wrongdoers.24
Ceding to this persuasion, Vladimir mandated,
Whoever violates these rules, which we have established in
accordance with the canons of the Church Fathers and
according to the regulations of the first emperors, whoever
shall violate these rules, whether my children, my greatgrandchildren, or a lieutenant in some town, or an overseer,
or judge, and they offend a church court, or someone else,
then may they be cursed in this age and in the next by the
seven ecumenical councils of the holy Fathers.25
This way, the Prince linked his political authority and binding force
of his enactments with the rules of the Church.
When the Social Concept mentions that medieval Russian
church-state relations were the best example of Symphonia,26 its
authors apparently have in mind something similar to such a veto
power. From the Social Concept’s perspective, the ideal framework
of church-state relations is when the Church does not meddle in
the routine work of the state machine but from time to time
interferes to correct grave errors that are potentially dangerous for
the entire society.
Albeit historically placed under the tutelage of the State during
the Synodal period (1721–1917), the Church formally enjoyed the
symbolic power to define religious dogma and to influence state
policies and rules related, even indirectly, to dogma. The Church
justified its power by the fact that the emperor was at the same time
the supreme legal authority and the head of the Church after 1721:
solely to him belonged both the privilege to issue legal norms
(acting as the emperor) and to legitimize them (acting as the head
of the Church). This system distorted the pattern of Symphonia as
two authorities coincided in one person. In 1918, the Patriarchate
was restored, and in the late 1980s the ROC returned to
24. Ferdinand M. Feldbrugge, Wergeld, Bloodwite, and the Emergence of Criminal Law, in
VON KONTINUITÄTEN UND BRÜCHEN: OSTRECHT IM WANDEL DER ZEITEN 3, 3 (Herbert
Küpper ed. 2011).
25. THE LAWS OF RUS’: TENTH TO FIFTEENTH CENTURIES 44 (Daniel H. Kaiser ed. and
trans., 1992) (alterations omitted).
26. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.4 (“Unlike Byzantine basileuses, Russian tsars
had a different legacy. For this and other historical reasons, relationship between the church
and the state authorities was more harmonious in Russian antiquity.”) (emphasis omitted).
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the pre-Petrine27 conceptualization of church-state relations,
representing this return as fidelity to the centuries-old tradition of
the Orthodox Symphonia.
Apparently, this basic presupposition has not changed over the
years; in its “conservative crusade”28 the ROC still relies on a
symphonic “concordat” with the State, considering Symphonia as
binding both on the State and the Church—as this dogma stems
from national tradition and spirituality. As the religious power to
formulate and to interpret this dogma belongs to the Church, the
Church turns out to be the only agency with the final say about the
validity of relevant legal enactments and whether they conform
with religious ethics or not. It is this theocratic supposition that is
implied in the Teaching’s statement about the supremacy of “the
divine truth, the eternal moral law given by the Lord . . . no matter
whether the will of particular people or people’s communities
agree with it or not.”29 Surely, states might ignore such ecclesiastic
judgments, and this happens very often in secular societies. The
Russian specificity is that the State made itself more vulnerable by
basing (in part) its legitimacy on national religious tradition and
therefore making its legitimacy dependent on continuing to play
the Symphonia with the Church.
II.

THE POWER OF TRADITION AGAINST
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES?

One imminent danger against which the ROC’s hierarchs
constantly plead is the liberal ideology of human rights that is
allegedly based on individualism and therefore is irreconcilable
with Russian national identity. This “liberal individualism” in the
1993 Constitution is completely ignored by the Social Concept.
Moreover, this policy document does not even mention the
Constitution. The ROC makes it explicit that it “cannot favour a
world order that puts in the centre of everything the human
27. Predating Peter the Great, tsar of Russia from 1682 to his death in 1725.
28. Kristina Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church’s Conservative Crusade, 116 CURRENT
HIST. 271 (2017).
29. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH’S BASIC
TEACHING
ON
HUMAN
DIGNITY,
FREEDOM
AND
RIGHTS
§ III.2
(2008),
https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights [hereinafter TEACHING]. While
this Article was being written, the Church removed the official English translation from its
website for unknown reasons. The English text is also available at
http://orthodoxrights.org/documents/russian-church-freedom-and-rights.
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personality darkened by sin”30 and stirs nationalist sentiments to
counter liberal individualism all over the world.31
This vision suggests that religion must prioritize collective
interest over individual choice. Given that the liberal interpretation
of the rule of law puts human value, as it is and irrespective of how
it is evaluated in terms of religious morals, at the foundation of
democratic legal order, religious criticism of liberal individualism
may sound like a challenge to the rule of law. Nonetheless, the
Social Concept implicitly disavows the right of each individual to
make his or her own ethical choice and develop his or her
personality without comparison to “correct” religious ethics. One
contemporary Russian researcher noticed that “the ROC has never
lived in a pluralistic society and such a situation is contrary to the
Church’s historical, spiritual and cultural experience. This
experience cannot consider pluralism as normative, as positive, as
a good dimension of human life.”32
Today, the degree of the conservative Symphonia is so intense
that it is not clear who plays the “first fiddle” in the exceptionalist
narrative that now prevails in Russia: the Church or the State.33 The
former inspired the illiberal narrative in the early 1990s. It is around
the agenda of desecularization defended by the ROC that sundry
conservative forces closed their ranks, while the first Russian
President, Boris Yeltsin, formally paid lip service to the agenda of
westernization and liberalization, shying from the Church’s
identitarian agenda.34 Consequential development of this agenda
involved the denial of human rights as an independent imperative
that binds religious morals. To restrict the human rights granted by
30. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § XVI.4.
31. It is symptomatic that the amendment to the R.F. Constitution about Russians as
the state-forming people came from within ROC circles, from the Orthodox archpriest
Dmitry Smirnov who is the head of the Patriarchal Commission for Family, Defense of
Motherhood and Childhood. See RPT predlagaet otrazit’ v Konstitutsii osobuiu rol’ russkogo
naroda, INTERFAX, (Feb. 9, 2020) http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=74235.
However, this proclivity to nationalism is not inherent in Russian Orthodox political
philosophy. See generally Anastasia Mitrofanova, L’Église orthodoxe russe: nationalisme ou
universalité?, 3 HERODOTE 97 (2017) (Fr.).
32. ALEKSEI SITNIKOV, PRAVOSLAVIE, INSTITUTY VLASTI I GRAZHDANSKOGO
OBSHCHESTVA 166 (2012).
33. See Fedor Stanzhevskiy & Dmitry Goncharko, Pluralism and Conflict: The Debate
About “Russian Values” and Politics of Identity, 13 J. NATIONALISM, MEMORY & LANGUAGE POL.
251 (2019).
34. Sergei Korolev, Sekuliarizatsiia i desekuliarizatsiia v kontekste kontseptsii
psevdomorfnogo razvitiia Rossii, 1 FILOSOFSKAIA MYSL’ 1–54 (2015).

1193

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:5 (2021)

the Constitution through application of religious morals is already
happening in Russian courts, which prefer to discard posited
constitutional freedoms for the sake of “traditional values.”
These traditional values work in Russian political discourse as
a means to counteract Western liberal ideology. The role of the ROC
in formulating and implementing traditional values can be seen
differently. It does not appear as if the Church continued to follow
the centuries-old pattern of submitting to be the State’s
instrument—the ROC clearly pursues a more active and
independent strategy in promoting its identitarian ideology
through the Russian State.35 The Russian State’s traditional-values
ideology was evidently informed by the religious conceptions
advocated by the ROC—in this aspect, the State and the Church are
likely to adhere to the pattern of Symphonia as coordination of their
mutual efforts to preserve the national identity of Russians is
allegedly based on Orthodoxy.36
In 2000, the future Patriarch Kirill (then Metropolitan of
Smolensk and Kaliningrad) set out this identarian ideology of
traditional values in the following manner:
If currently liberal thought is used as a basis for the country’s
public and social development model, then, in full compliance
with the liberal principle of checks and balances, it must be
countered with a policy of introducing a system of values that are
traditional for Russia into the upbringing of youth, education, and
interpersonal relationship formation. Thus, the issue of shaping
legislation, education, culture, social relations, and public morals
is, in fact, a matter of preservation of our national civilization in
the coming century. It is a matter of finding our place in the global
community of nations and of survival as an Orthodox nation. 37

Later, in 2006, he saw the central idea of his conception of
traditional values in “according human rights with traditional

35. See Kristina Stoeckl, Постсекулярные конфликты и глобальная борьба за
традиционные ценности, 4 GOSUDARSTVO, RELIGIIA, TSERKOV’ V ROSSII I ZA RUBEZHOM
223–41 (2016).
36. “Within the framework of the narrative of Russia as ‘the guardian of traditional
values,’ the interests of the Kremlin and the ROC are complementary and their efforts
parallel.” ALICJA CURANOVIĆ, THE GUARDIANS OF TRADITIONAL VALUES: RUSSIA AND THE
RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE QUEST FOR STATUS 22 (2015).
37. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Norma very kak norma
zhizni,
NEZAVISIMAIA
GAZETA
(Feb.
16,
2000)
(author’s
translation),
https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2000-02-16/8_norma.html.
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morality.”38 Such references to religious morals in the matter of
human rights provide a practicable (for the illiberal Russian
government) defense of exceptionalism against universal human
rights standards, as “according rights with morality” inevitably
implies restricting these rights in a conservative sense.
Assuming that Russian people have their own religious morals
separate from the morals forecasted in other Orthodox peoples, let
alone the morals of people of the decayed West, there is no good
reason to subordinate State policies to universal human rights
standards informed by “alien” morals.39 This is another convenient
ideological argument persistently used by Russian political
leaders.40 This is also the position of the Church implicitly exposed
in another policy document: the Basic Teaching of the Russian
Orthodox Church on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights (the
Teaching), adopted on June 22, 2008.41
In various matters—education, marriage, and other social
fields—the ROC does not shy away from imposing on the State its
views informed by religious morals. The ROC’s strategy for
fighting abortion, same-sex marriage, and other practices seems to
rely on the same theoretical background that prioritizes the
Church’s opinion, including the power of ethical judgment about
admissibility of human rights.42 At first sight, this approach follows
the original meanings of Symphonia, providing the Church with
symbolic ideological power. The problem is not that this power of
judgment belongs to the Church, but the legal consequences, which
are anticipated in the Social Concept and the Teaching. In case of a
negative judgment, the relevant constitutional provision ceases to
38. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman, Dep’t for External
Church Rels. of the Moscow Patriarchate, Presentation at the ‘Evolution of Moral
Values and Human Rights in Multicultural Society’ Conference: The Experience of
Viewing the Problems of Human Rights and their Moral Foundations in European
Religious Communities (Oct. 30, 2006).
39. For a description of the growing nationalist moods in the ROC and their
intellectual origins, see Zoe Knox, Russian Orthodoxy, Russian Nationalism and Patriarch Aleksii
II, 4 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 533 (2005), and Daniela Kalkandjieva, Orthodoxy and Nationalism
in Russian Orthodoxy, 3-4 ST. VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL Q. 281 (2013).
40. See ANASTASIA LIKHACHEVA, IGOR MAKAROV, PAVEL ANDREEV, ALEXANDER
GABUEV & EKATERINA MAKAROVA, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA:
VALADAI
DISCUSSION
CLUB
REPORT
(2014),
http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/
Identity_eng.pdf.
41. TEACHING, supra note 29.
42. Alexander Agadjanian, Liberal Individual and Christian Culture: Russian Orthodox
Teaching on Human Rights in Social Theory Perspective, 38 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 97 (2010).
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be binding, so that believers have the right to disobey.43 The
language of the Teaching allows for the conclusion that this religious
right (and obligation at the same time) is not subject to constraints
of constitutional and international law—this right is constructed as
a religious duty and empowers believers to consider legal norms as
having no binding force if those laws contravene religious ethics.44
III. THE CHURCH AIMED AT BROADENING THE
LIMITS OF ITS AUTHORITY?
In accordance with the Social Concept, the ROC accepts the
general principle of separation of state and church: they shall be
distinguished by their competences, and cooperation must be
43. In 2000, the ROC openly authorized civil disobedience to state laws.
If the Church and her holy authorities find it impossible to obey state laws and
orders, after a due consideration of the problem, they may take the following
action: enter into direct dialogue with authority on the problem, call upon the
people to use the democratic mechanisms to change the legislation or review the
authority’s decision, apply to international bodies and the world public opinion
and appeal to her faithful for peaceful civil disobedience.
SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.5. The 2008 Teaching also allows it, but in more careful
words:
Without seeking a revolutionary reconstruction of the world and acknowledging
the rights of other social groups to participate in social transformations on the basis
of their own worldview, the Orthodox Christians reserve the right to participate
in building public life in a way that does not contradict their faith and
moral principles.
TEACHING, supra note 29, § V.4. One recent example of this disobedience was the incitement
on the part of various ROC hierarchs to ignore COVID-related restrictions. See Mikhail
Antonov, Russian Orthodox Symphonia in the Time of Coronavirus , I NT ’ L C TR . FOR L. &
R ELIGION S TUD . (July 24, 2020), https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2020/07/24/russian orthodox-symphonia-in-the-time-of-coronavirus/.
44. “While recognizing the value of freedom of choice, the Church affirms that this
freedom will inevitably disappear if the choice is made in favor of evil.” TEACHING,
supra note 29, § II.2. “The exercise of human rights should not be used to justify any
encroachment on religious holy symbols things, cultural values and the identity of a nation.”
Id. § III.5. It has often been suggested that the ROC has always been subservient to the State
and supportive of its autocracy and stays so. Contra VLADIMIR VALDENBERG,
DREVNERUSSKIE UCHENIIA O PREDELAKH TSARSKOI VLASTI (1916) (persuasively refuting
the thesis about the Church’s submissiveness). Whatever the Church’s teaching on civil
disobedience might be, there are no compelling reasons to consider this “caesaropapism”
as an immutable feature of Russian Orthodoxy. It was not without good grounds that one
of the first commentators of the Social Doctrine found in paragraph III.5 a new approach to
the doctrine of disobedience: “[T]his point of doctrine seems to be an important step to
overcome an archaic Byzantine symphony of Church and state, by transferring to a more
modern model of Church-state relations, founded on a contractual basis.” Benjamin Novik,
Analysis of “The Fundamentals of Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church,” 22
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION E. EUR., no. 5, 2002, at 8.
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based on mutual support and mutual responsibility without one
side’s intruding into the exclusive domain of the other.”45
Nonetheless, the way Chapter III of the Social Concept describes the
domains of the Church’s competence implicitly broadcasts broader
theocratic ambitions. By compiling a short list of exclusive state
competences46 and outlining a longer list of joint competences of
state and church,47 the Social Concept endows the Church with a
broad domain of implied competences that has so far been
unknown in the history of Byzantium or Russia.
The Social Concept also provides a closed short list of state
prerogatives where the Church is precluded from intervening:
resistance to sin by force, use of temporal authoritative powers and
assumption of governmental functions which presuppose
coercion.48 Another version of this list a few paragraphs below also
includes political struggle, civil war, and intelligence.49 This list is
much shorter compared with the exclusive prerogatives of state
powers in Byzantium where the Church was not allowed to
intrude.50 This division of powers between the Church and the State
is reminiscent of medieval Catholic conceptions such as the two
swords doctrine. What is more important, there were no such closed
lists in Byzantine law. It implicitly belonged to the emperor to
determine the limits of possible intervention from the Church into
“human affairs.” Also, the emperor could at any time lengthen this
list at his discretion or prohibit any interference of the Church in
any matters.
A broader, more open list of the Church’s fields of cooperation
with the State is provided elsewhere in the Social Concept, which
embraces various spheres from social programs, national
healthcare, culture, family, and education to international law,
national legislation, crime control, and public morality51: all of these
spheres in Byzantium were explicitly reserved for the state. It
suffices to take a look at the contents of the Social Concept to see the
scope of the ROC’s ambitions that by far exceed what the Byzantine
45. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.4.
46. Id. § III.3.
47. Id. § III.8.
48. Id. § III.3.
49. Id. § III.8.
50. Deno J. Geanakoplos, Church and State in the Byzantine Empire: A Reconsideration of
the Problem of Caesaropapism, 34 CHURCH HISTORY 381, 388–92 (1965).
51. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.8.
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or medieval Russian Church could claim based on the theory of
Symphonia. The Social Concept approvingly cites the 1917–18
Declaration of the ROC Local Council, which mandated that
decrees and statutes issued the Orthodox Church for herself in the
order established by herself, as well as deeds of the church
government and court shall be recognized by the State as legally
valid and important unless they violate state laws . . . State laws
concerning the Orthodox Church shall be issued only with the
consent of the church authorities.52

However, it remains unclear whether the ROC claims in
modern day that its decrees and statutes shall also become sources
of Russian law. It is hardly conceivable in the foreseeable future
that religious doctrines would obtain the force of law, like the
decisions of ecumenical councils that were accepted as law in the
Byzantine Empire pursuant to Novel 131 of Justinian, or that the
Russian State would require the Church’s approval for some of its
laws. Not only does the technical question of “sources of law”
impede the implementation of Symphonia in Russian law, but so
does the fundamental legal principle of rule of law.53 It might be
that the ROC implies here not the power to regulate social life (to
issue legal rules binding on every member of society) but rather the
power to define (to provide interpretations to legal rules and
thereby to control application of the law in matters that are relevant
to the Church). Regardless, this kind of Symphonia implicates that
the ROC believes that its dogma prevails over the law.54
IV. RUSSIAN LAW AND IDEOLOGICAL RAPPROCHEMENT OF THE
CHURCH AND THE STATE
Until recently, this combination of the ideological authority of
the Church and the political power of the State might have seemed
a reasonable balance. Establishment of state or official ideology is
prohibited by Article 13 of the Russian Constitution, but Russia
badly needed an ideology in the early 2000s when Putin proclaimed

52. Id. § III.4.
53. See supra Part II.
54. In some situations, secular law can cede to religious ideology to protect the right
of believers (e.g., conscientious objectors); in such situations, religious denominations can be
said to have success in prioritizing their dogmas over general legal provisions. It is a matter
of degree to decide whether the continued triumph of a religious denomination over official
law constitutes a threat to the rule of law or not.
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his program of rebuilding Russia as a great power, with allusions
to the “great national past.”55 Almost immediately, already in 2000,
the ROC’s Social Concept outlined ideological preferences and
rhetoric for political authorities for years to come.
In terms of this new Symphonia, the Russian State concedes
ideological leadership to the ROC and implicitly accepts the
secondary ideological role of “protector of the true belief,” a title
ascribed to the Russian State since the late Middle Ages. This
Symphonia implicitly requires the State to submit itself to the
ideological authority of the Church in its capacity of “soul” (the
guiding force of politeia, according to the Sixth Novel of Justinian).56
As far as both the ROC and the Russian State follow similar
conservative agendas of “traditional values,” there should be no
important contradictions between them. In 2000, the Church found
itself in a position to create a mutually beneficial relationship: the
Church gets to assert its symbolic authority over the State and its
law while at the same time demanding non-interference of the State
into religious issues, and the State gets to profit from the Church’s
ideological authority to reinforce state legitimacy, so that both are
able to fight their common “liberal enemies.”
The 2020 constitutional amendments57 have apparently been
aimed at affirming this Symphonia. For example, the reference to
“the belief in God as this belief was transferred to us from our
ancestors” as the guarantee of Russia’s state integrity in Article 67.1
implicitly means that the “vertical of power” (the top-down
command structure established by Vladimir Putin during his

55. Already in his inaugural speech on May 7, 2000, Putin asserted, “There is no doubt
that we can draw strength from our past . . . [and will] feel pride in these pages that we are
writing in the history of our great nation.” Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Inaugural
Address (May 7, 2004), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48210.
56. THE CIVIL LAW: INCLUDING THE TWELVE TABLES, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, THE
RULES OF ULPIAN & THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS (S.P. Scott trans., 1932),
https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Anglica/N6_Scott.htm.
57. Federal’nyĭ Zakon RF o Popravke k Konstitut͡sii Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡siĭ [Federal Law
of the Russian Federation on Amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation]
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII, [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2020, No. 1. The official Russian version is available at
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202003140001.
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presidency)58 in Russia is legitimized by the Orthodoxy.59 Along
with mentioning God (as proposed by Patriarch Kirill),60 the 2020
amendments introduced into the Constitution a number of other
conservative ideas that reflect dogma: historical roots of religious
beliefs, heterosexual family, traditional values, etc.61 The
practicality of these amendments is clear—they help to keep
political authorities and courts immune to the ubiquitous
reproaches of sham constitutionalism, meaning to act contrary
to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.62 At the same time, these
amendments indirectly reaffirm the ideological authority of
the Church that managed to insert its doctrinal provisions into
the Constitution.
As shown above, the ROC profited from the ideological
vacuum and weakness of the Russian State in the early 1990s,
having acquired a good deal of political influence. But short-term
political expediency was and remains questionable in terms of the
rule of law. The dilemma for the ROC was that by accepting secular
human rights and liberal principles, the Church would risk losing
its ideological power or, at least, would not increase it. On the other
side, by rejecting these values, the Church would risk entering a
conflict with the State which is formally bound by human rights63—
the Russian Constitution considers them as fundamentals of its
constitutional order.64 De facto, the State has the prerogative to
put constitutional principles aside when pursuing its geopolitical
and other objectives. But it is hardly believable that the State is
prepared to tolerate the Church’s claims to the same sovereign

58. See ANDREW MONAGHAN, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE RUSSIAN VERTIKAL: THE
TANDEM, POWER AND THE ELECTIONS (2011).
59. Mikhail Antonov, God and “the Belief of Ancestors” in the Russian
Constitution, I NT ’ L C TR . FOR L. & R ELIGION S TUD . (Oct. 31, 2020),
https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2020/10/31/god-and-the-belief-of-ancestors-in-therussian-constitution/.
60. Elizaveta Koroleva, Popravki v Konstitut͡sii͡u: t͡serkovʹ prosit ne zabytʹ o boge,
GAZETA.RU (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2020/02/01/12939446.shtml?updated.
61. KONSTITUTSIIA
ROSSIĬSKOĬ
FEDERATSII
[KONST.
RF]
[CONSTITUTION]
arts. 67, 68, 72 (Russ.).
62. See generally Andrey Medushevskiy, Russian Constitutional Development: Formal and
Informal Practices, 6 BRICS L.J. 100 (2019).
63. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 17 (Russ.).
64. Id. ch. 2.

1200

1201

Russian Symphonia vs. Rule of Law?

power to exclude itself from constitutional order.65 After all, it is
not out of the question that post-Putin Russia might reaffirm
its fidelity to the letter and spirit of the 1993 Constitution and its
liberal interpretation.
Putting this situation in Schmittean terms, if the Church acts as
a direct enemy of human rights (in their liberal meaning enshrined
in the Constitution), it formally can become the enemy of the State.
This does not mean that the Church will become the State’s enemy
in reality for the foreseeable future. In many situations the Russian
State does not really care about the Constitution,66 so the State can
side with the Church on human rights despite the Constitution.
Nonetheless, by rejecting human rights the Church would formally
challenge the political order established by the State in the
Constitution—the power which belongs only to the sovereign
(including the power to act beyond the law and to introduce
exceptions from the law). From this perspective, the ROC can fall
into what Professor Stoeckl calls the “disestablishment model,”67 in
which the Church would act like an antagonist of the State, engaged
in moral or cultural opposition to it. The tension between the
Church and the State would not concern human rights as such—for
the ROC, attacking human rights would also imply challenging the
State’s sovereign powers and its symbolic authority.
To avoid this dangerous conundrum, the ROC attempted to
“appropriate” human rights—in the sense of interpreting them in
the way they are subordinated to religious morals. This attempt
was reflected, among other sources, in the Teaching, which opens
with the statement that “human rights protection is often used

65. The interpretation of Symphonia as empowering the Church to control the
sovereign powers of the State can be found in the conception of Archbishop Serafim Sobolev
(1881–1950). His book Russian Ideology (1939) presupposed a kind of checks and balances
mechanism between church and state authorities, picturing the Church and the State as coprotectors of the national sovereignty of Russia. In the recent years, this conception has
grown in popularity among contemporary ROC’s thinkers and conservative ideologists. E.g.,
Tatiana L. Migunova & Luybava R. Romanovskaia, Simfonia vlastei kak printsip
vzaimootnoshenii mezhdu cherkov’iu i gosudarstvom, 3 VESTNIK NIZHEGORODSKOGO
UNIVERSITETA: GOSUDARSTOVO I PRAVO 147 (2013); Hieromonk Gennadius, Tserkovnopoliticheskie vzgliady sviatitelia Serafima (Soboleva), 1 VESTNIK ISTORICHESKOGO OBSHCHESTVA
SANKT-PETERBURGSKOI DUKHOVNOI AKADEMII 29 (2018). In 2016, Archbishop Serafim was
canonized by the ROC.
66. E.g., William E. Pomeranz, Russia’s Broken Constitution, WILSON CTR. (June 26,
2020), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-broken-constitution.
67. Kristina Stoeckl, Three Models of Church-State Relations in Contemporary Russia,
3 GOSUDARSTVO, RELIGIIA, TSERKOV’ V ROSSII I ZA RUBEZHOM 195–223 (2018).
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as a plea to realize ideas which in essence radically disagree
with Christian teaching.”68 It therefore belongs to the Church to
delimit the extent to which human rights are coextensive
with “faith and moral principles”69 and, implicitly, condemn—or,
at least, bring into question—all other human rights. Symbolically,
the Teaching does not mention the Russian Constitution and
the ROC’s acceptance of its provisions. Instead, the Church relies
on the concept of human dignity, trying to align human rights
with religious morals sub specie aeternitatis or, in terms of
legal philosophy, relying on a kind of suprastatutory natural
(divine) law.
In the post-Soviet period, relations between the ROC and the
Russian State have been mutually profitable. As in previous
centuries, the Church has supported the legitimacy of the State and
assumed privileges and protection from it. In pre-1917 Russia, this
Symphonia of the Church and the State was one of the cornerstones
of the law, as reflected in the famous motto “Orthodoxy, Autocracy,
Nationality.” Legality and legitimacy of the church-state tandem in
Imperial Russia reinforced each other. There were no concerns
about the Church’s conformity with prerevolutionary Russian law,
albeit the Russian version of caesaropapism70 was harshly criticized
by intellectuals from other perspectives.
In 1917, the Church was separated from the Russian State and
was banned from all fields of social and political life. The 1993
Russian Constitution confirmed that the supreme values of the
Russian State and society were not derived from the Holy
Scriptures or from religious dogma and, according to the literal
meaning of the Constitution, they were not subject to any control
or approval of the Church, which is separate from the State.71 As
part of those supreme values, human rights were proclaimed to lie
at the foundation of Russian legal order.72 With this, the ROC’s
claims to have a say in political matters and to define the extent of
the admissibility of human rights are formally incompatible with

68. TEACHING, supra note 29, Introduction.
69. Id. § V.4.
70. Employing this term only to refer to the factual order of the relations between the
State, the Church, and the Emperor in Byzantium, I follow the established historiographical
tradition, 4 ARNOLD TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 320–408, 592–623 (1954), without
approving it or rejecting other, dissenting theories.
71. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 14 (Russ.).
72. Id. art. 18.
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constitutional law. The ROC’s claim to act “symphonically” with
the State concerning the binding force of human rights inevitably
enters into conflict with what the rule of law in a democratic state
shall be. (Formally, Russia is both a rule-of-law (Rechtsstaat) and a
democratic state, according to its Constitution).73 Also, the
legitimacy that the State draws from its symphonic tandem with
the Church appears questionable, to say the least, from the
perspective of legality.
Conceptualization of this new state of affairs requires from the
ROC a good deal of creativity, as in its intellectual tradition the
Church does not have conceptions that are suited to this
constitutional framework—both in Byzantium and in pre-1917
Russia, the alliance of church and state was approved by state law.
Priority of the Constitution and federal laws over all other social
norms in Russian society translates to, among other things, the
secular principle according to which citizens are bound by the legal
norms and principles created by the State, irrespective of their
conformity with the Holy Scriptures, religion, or ethical doctrines.74
Within this constitutional context, the Church may not make any
judgments on the validity of constitutional and statutory law,
human rights inclusive,75 and the State does not need religious
justification for imposing these norms and principles upon citizens,
or for being bound by human rights in its activities.76 Along with
the separation principle, influencing lawmaking and lawapplication through imposing religious ideologies plainly
contradicts Article 14, which bans obligatory ideologies.77
However, multiple observers argue that these formal
requirements from the 1993 Constitution are not fully implemented
in reality.78 These statements seem to be confirmed by the top

73. Id. art. 1, para. 1; id. art. 4, para. 2.
74. Id. art. 4, para 2.
75. Id. art. 15.
76. Id. art. 18.
77. Id. art. 14.
78. E.g., Marina Shishova, Spiritual and Political Dimensions in the Conception of the
Russian Orthodox Church Concerning Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights, in ORTHODOX
CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 351–64 (Evert Van der Zweerde & Alfons Brüning eds.,
2012); John Anderson, Religion, State and ‘Sovereign Democracy’ in Putin’s Russia, 2 J. RELIGIOUS
& POL. PRAC. 249–66 (2016); Alexander Agadjanian, Tradition, Morality and Community:
Elaborating Orthodox Identity in Putin’s Russia, 45 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 39–60 (2017).
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hierarchs of the Church.79 Not infrequently, the Church incites
political leaders and legal actors to disrespect the rule of law.80 As
has been demonstrated above, the Church criticizes human rights
or, at least, prefers to interpret them far from the original meaning
of the Constitution, which was drafted according to the patterns of
“liberal individualism” and without the Church’s participation.81
This strategy of the ROC does not remain without effect in
lawmaking and in law-application. The ideas voiced in the Social
Doctrine, the Teaching, and other policy documents of the ROC are
regularly repeated by politicians, judges of higher courts, and other
legal actors—not only in their publications or public speeches, but
also in their decisions.82
V.

THE RULE OF LAW AND RELIGIOUS ETHICS

There are many gateways through which the Church can
influence the interpretation of legal rules and principles. Human
dignity is one of these ways. As could be expected, the definition
and interpretation of dignity falls into the sphere of the Church’s
ideological competences as far as “human dignity” is presumed to
reflect God’s image in man.83
From the very beginning, the Teaching makes clear that “[t]he
human rights theory is based on human dignity as its fundamental
notion. This is the reason why the need arises to set forth the
Church’s view of human dignity.”84 Dignity is derived from the fact
that man is created according to the image of God,85 and is
79. PATRIARCH KIRILL, SVOBODA I OTVETSTVENNOST’: V POISKAKH GARMONII. PRAVA
CHELOVEKA I DOSTOINSTVO LICHNOSTI (2016).
80. Sergei Firsov, Tserkov’ i gosudarstvo pri Sviateishem Patriarkhe Kirille (Gundiaeve):
osnovnye tendentsii razvitiia, 3 VESTNIK RUSSKOI KHRISTIANSKOI GUMANITARNOI AKADEMII
351–60 (2013).
81. E.g., Mikhail Antonov, The Russian Constitutional Court as a Mediating Link Between
Russian and European Law?, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 547–66 (Philip Czech
et al. eds., 2019).
82. See, e.g., John Anderson, Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric
Symphonia?, 61 J. INT’L AFFS. 185 (2007).
83. Although the Western concept of human dignity stems from Christian
anthropology and is largely informed by it, secular definitions are also possible. Among
others, such is the Kantian conception of dignity which prohibits each and every
instrumentalization of human beings and requires treating everybody as a subject and
nobody as an object. However, this prohibition is too general and, in practice, quite often is
enriched by the “positive content” which originates from religious intellectual traditions.
84. TEACHING, supra note 29, § I.1.
85. Id. § I.2.
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described as God’s gift to human beings. The preliminary
conclusion from this argument is that human beings are
responsible for the direction and way of their lives86—this moral
responsibility lies in the foundation of law.87
Dignity is defined by the Church as a moral category par
excellence. This implies the supremacy of religious ethics over other
normative social orders, including legal order: “in the cases where
the human law completely rejects the absolute divine norm,
replacing it by an opposite one, it ceases to be law and becomes
lawlessness, in whatever legal garments it may dress itself.”88 At
the same time, ethical obligations shall precede any rights human
beings may enjoy in social life. It follows that human rights are
valid insofar as they are compatible with human dignity and their
binding force is dependent on their congruity with religious ethics:
“According to the Orthodox tradition, a human being preserves his
God-given dignity and grows in it only if he lives in accordance
with moral norms because these norms express the primordial and
therefore authentic human nature not darkened by sin.”89
This conclusion allows one to argue that “human rights cannot
be superior to the values of the spiritual world” and therefore can
be restricted to fit religious morals.90 The Teaching provides a list of
restrictions on the use of concrete human rights freedoms.91 The
conclusion of Section III of the Teaching is telling:
To make it possible the implementation of human rights should
not come into conflict with God-established moral norms and
traditional morality based on them. One’s human rights cannot be
set against the values and interests of one’s homeland, community
and family. The exercise of human rights should not be used to
justify any encroachment on religious holy symbols things,
cultural values and the identity of a nation.92

One cannot help but notice that the development of case law of
the Russian Constitutional Court until the 2020 constitutional
amendments confirms, in various formulations, these principles:

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id.
See SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § IV.2.
Id. § IV.3 (emphasis omitted).
TEACHING, supra note 29, § I (emphasis omitted).
Id. § III.2.
See id. § IV.
Id. § III (emphasis omitted).
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human rights shall be protected if they do not encroach national
identity, sovereignty, and traditional values.93
Claiming the power to define and delimit human rights
according to religious ethics, the Church indirectly challenges the
constitutional order of Russia and reveals its political ambitions.
Although not clearly articulated until now, these ambitions imply
that the ROC reserves for itself the power to “teach” the State and
the entire Russian society about the “correct religious ethics” and
to obligate the State to “balance” human rights with this ethical
doctrine. In terms of the body politics that underpins the Social
Concept, the Church as “moral entrepreneur” guarantees the inner
peace of the social body, while the State is expected to provide its
force and coercion to implement this guarantee.
Following these philosophical conclusions, high Orthodox
hierarchs often condemn protecting the rights of minorities as
apology of all-permissiveness. Thus, in 2017, Patriarch Kirill
stressed that “freedom cannot be confused with all-permissiveness
and the concept of human rights and freedoms should be
complemented with the ideas of moral responsibility.”94 From this
point of view, putting religious morals below human rights
is wrong: “The liberal treatment of human rights and freedoms
presupposes the absolutization of the sovereignty of the
individual and his rights outside the moral context.”95 Here, one
can notice how the Church tries to bridge its narrative to the
contemporary conservative “political theology” based on the
concept of sovereignty.
The problem that the Patriarch failed to mention but seemingly
had in mind is that human rights are derived from and intrinsically
connected with the “secular liberal understanding” he has decried.
To find a way to criticize human rights, he preferred to rely on the
93. See, e.g., Alekseyev v. Russia, App. Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 & 14599/09 (Oct. 21,
2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-101257 (discussing bans on gay parades in
Russia); Bayev v. Russia, App. Nos. 67667/09, 44092/12 & 56717/12 (June 20, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-174422 (discussing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender activists); Markin v Russia, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 77 (2012) (discussing paying
maternity leave to a military man). For the interplay between the protection of human rights
and the argument of sovereignty in Russian law, see Mikhail Antonov, Sovereignty and
Russian Resistance to Human Rights, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 529 (Philip
Czech et al. eds., 2020).
94. Patriarch Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Opening Remarks
at the Presidium of the Interreligious Council in Russia (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://mospat.ru/en/2017/10/24/news151731/.
95. Id.
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concept of dignity. Rejecting “such social sinful things as abortion,
homosexuality or euthanasia,” which are pleaded under the banner
of human rights, the Patriarch Kirill is confident that “[w]ithout the
religious roots the idea of dignity comes to hang in the air. . . . If we
tear away the religious foundation, if we tear man away from God,
then human dignity loses its justification as well.”96 If not directly,
in this and in other allocutions the Patriarch and other hierarchs of
the Church deny the priority of human rights guaranteed by the
constitution, make them dependent on religious ethics, and thereby
bring their views and the entire ROC political doctrine into
dangerous opposition with the principle of rule of law.
In the post-Soviet era, there have been almost no serious
conflicts between the Russian State and the ROC. This is easily
explained by the fact that so far both have pursued similar
conservative agendas, each taking advantage of its part in the
“Symphonia of powers.” But the Church’s hierarchs should consider
that this symphonic cooperation is not guaranteed going forward.
In Putin’s Russia any future movement toward liberalization can
appear as an unsustainable pipe dream. But can one contend that
there is absolutely no chance that this illiberal agenda will be
discontinued in post-Putin Russia in favor of liberal ideology? This
ideology has one important advantage—even after the 2020
amendments, it coincides with the letter of the Constitution and
thereby has a strong legitimizing effect. The change of ideologies is
a normal process in the political development of states, but in
contrast, for churches the change of their ideological landmarks
is usually a long and difficult mission, if even possible in the
first place. After all, one cannot exclude that hostility toward
religious, ethical, and other pluralism can eventually prompt
the ROC to oppose more actively the principle of rule of law
in Russia, if political “winds” sometimes start blowing in a more
liberal direction.
CONCLUSION
Dwelling on further developments of church-state relations in
Russia, John Burgess admitted “the possibility that Russia could
someday restore an Orthodox monarchy and hence a Church-state

96. Id.
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symphonia.”97 But this can happen only if the Russian State
becomes weak and falls under the tutelage of the Church, and this
latter’s strategy would be to weaken the state. This strategy would
be anything but politically safe for the ROC. The ROC is unable,
under present circumstances, to impose its will on the autocratic
Russian State and is likely to understand that such attempts would
be destructive for the Church itself. In its tandem with the Russian
State the ROC is still a minor, a weaker partner of the State,
dependent on its will. Both historically and presently the Church
does not control the State and its law, although sometimes it
influences both. Still, the power of ideals is often irrational and can
prompt irrational action even if there are no real chances of success.
It is especially true in the sphere of religious belief which, in the
words of the Gospel, is able to move mountains. Therefore, one
needs to take seriously the ambitions of the ROC exposed in the
Social Concept, the Teaching, and its other policy documents.
Challenging the foundations of Russia’s constitutional order
through defiance of the liberal conception of the rule of law (the
ethical pluralism which entails “all-permissiveness” for minorities)
has become a routine topic of the ROC,98 despite the fact that
realistically the Church has neither reasons nor forces to undermine
this order. The Church also prefers to ignore the fact that the
Russian Constitution’s literal meaning is incompatible with
conservative religious morals. At the same time, it relies on the
Constitution and on human rights to vindicate its own interests.
Recent developments due to COVID-19 in Russia have exposed
this inconsistency. In the spring of 2020, one could observe how the
Church decried the unconstitutionality of certain antivirus
restrictions, asserting its constitutional rights against the State. The
theocratic formulations of the Social Concept prompted sundry
clericals, who took the idea of Symphonia literally, to challenge state
commands and to insist the Patriarchate resist the State’s
interferences more actively. With this, the Symphonia of churchstate relations in Russia in the spring and summer of 2020 seemed
to start transforming into cacophony. Disastrous for the Church’s
economic interests and political ambitions, this is also a serious
challenge for the State, which now must reevaluate its control over
97. JOHN P. BURGESS, HOLY RUS’: THE REBIRTH OF ORTHODOXY IN THE NEW RUSSIA
32 (2017).
98. See generally Hanna Staehle, Seeking New Language: Patriarch Kirill’s Media
Strategy, 46 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 384 (2018).
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the Church. Such a development is not unfamiliar—Russian history
has already seen similar patterns in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Given the ideological ambitions of Russian political
leadership, one cannot exclude the possibility or probability that
the ROC will eventually become first chair in the caesaropapist
orchestra conducted by the Russian State pursuant to the literal
meaning of Symphonia as it was composed in Byzantine history
more than a millennium ago.
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